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Abstract
In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations
with a pollution sector by allowing generations to have a certain pollution
perception with regards to the stock of pollution. Pollution perception,
assumed to be part of the generations’ preferences, can be either a concern
for the flow of pollution only, or for the stock, or anything in between. We
analyse the different steady states for their implications on intergenerational
equity.
Our main result is that if generations are only partly concerned with
the actual stock of pollution, then periodic cycling will occur. We use the
concept of Intergenerational Moral Intuition to analyse this periodic cycling.
Our main policy conclusion is that decision makers who would like to achieve
intergenerational equitable outcomes must either use the maximin criterion
or take decisions spanning several generations in order to avoid the period
cycling effect.
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1 Introduction
This article analyses pollution perception in an overlapping generations
framework a` la John and Pecchenino (1994) and specifically Seegmuller and
Verche`re (2005). We extend the literature by allowing generations to per-
ceive the utility derived from pollution to differ from the actual stock of
pollution. We interpret this partial concern for pollution stock as coming
from the preferences of the generations. In the extreme case the utility will
be a function of the changes in pollution only.
This appears to be a rather important property of models which seems
to have been neglected in the literature up to now. The factor we introduce
has similar properties as the habit factor in consumption, which has seen
some recent research by e.g. Wendner (2002). The qualitative results we
obtain are however very different.
The idea for the importance of introducing the pollution perception fac-
tor can be demonstrated with a simple example. A generation, born at time
t = 0, will be born with an existing level of pollution equal to P0. However,
this generation will not know the world differently. For them the existing
pollution stock will be the natural level of the environment. So the only
effect of pollution that they might feel is the change in the pollution stock
during the time of their existence, as given by P1 − hP0. We generalise
this idea by allowing the generations to be concerned with either the stock
of pollution (h = 0), or the change in pollution (h = 1), or anything in
between(0 < h < 1).
It seems that an obvious problem in this context is intergenerational
equity. If the newborn generations perceive the existing level of pollution
as the natural one (e.g. if h = 1) then this decouples utility from pollution
accumulation. Hence one could imagine that generations allow pollution to
grow forever. For 0 < h < 1 one could imagine that pollution tends to a
rather high steady state. Thus it seems very easy that potential pollution
thresholds could be crossed. However, we are able to show that even without
the existence of pollution thresholds this pollution perception can lead to
serious concerns of intergenerational inequality. For this we use the concept
of Intergenerational Moral Intuition, which is able to pinpoint the source of
the intergenerational inequality. In fact, in this article we are only going to
be concerned with this second intergenerational inequality.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic features
of the model and derives the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 describes
the dynamics. Section 4 reviews the prior results within the theory of inter-
generational equity.
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2 The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive overlapping generations economy. We
allow for perfect foresight and discrete time with an indeterminate horizon,
t = 0, 1, 2.... For simplicity we assume that population is constant and each
generation consists of a single representative individual. At each date a
generation lives for two periods, young and old. Furthermore, the young
generations supply their labour inelastically and decide whether to save or
invest (in abatement), and the old generations obtain utility from consuming
their savings. In addition, we assume that the old generations feel the effects
of pollution as a disutility, but perceive pollution differently for the various
reasons as laid out in the introduction.
2.1 The Pollution Accumulation
Pollution is assumed to accumulate as described by the following equation
Pt+1 = (1− b)Pt + βct − γAt, (1)
where b ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of pollution absorption, β(> 0) is a parameters of
consumption externality, representing the rate of pollution emissions from a
unit of consumption, and γ(> 0) represents the strength of the abatement
effort, At, on pollution. Hence, the stock of tomorrow’s pollution is partially
depending on today’s pollution stock and is being increased by consumption
and reduced by abatement. Notice that we do not assume irreversibilities
here.
Furthermore we choose the pollution accumulation in preference for the
environmental accumulation function a` la John and Pecchenino (1994) be-
cause we feel uncomfortable with the assumption that the initial level of
the environment must be above the natural level. John and Pecchenino
(1994) had to introduce this assumption in order to obtain a concave utility
function.
2.2 The Generations
Agents derive utility over consumption and pollution in period t + 1 only.
Their utility function is of the form
U(ct+1, Pt+1, Pt) = ln ct+1 − α ln(Pt+1 − hPt), (2)
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Figure 1: Pollution perception for different values of the parameter h
where ct+1 refers to (per capita) consumption in period t + 1, and Pt+1
and Pt refer to the stock of pollution in periods t + 1 and t respectively1.
0 < α < 1 measures the relative preference of the generations for pollution
over consumption.
Thus, we extend the literature by allowing generations to perceive (either
partly, h ∈ (0, 1), or fully, h = 1, or not at all, h = 0) the pollution stocks in
different ways. We interpret this perception as a concern for either the stock
or the flow of pollution, or anything in between. Figure 1 demonstrates how
the perception of pollution changes given different levels of the parameter
h. For h = 0, generations perceive only the stock of pollution, for h = 1
they are only concerned with the flow, and for 0 < h < 1 they are partly
concerned with either.
Generations then maximise their utility with respect to savings and sub-
ject to their budget constraints which are given by
wt −At = st, (3)
(1 + rt+1)st = ct+1, (4)
1For any Pt and Pt+1 there ∃hˆ such that Pt+1 > hˆPt, ∀t. Throughout the paper we
assume that h ≤ hˆ. We utilise this utility function in order to obtain simple and explicit
solutions. Furthermore it is the only one which fits our assumptions. In addition, for
0 < Pt+1 − hPt < 1, the effect of pollution perception is able to increase utility.
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and the pollution accumulation equation (1). Here, w, A, s and r refer to
the wages obtained, the abatement effort, the savings carried forward to the
next period and the interest obtained on the savings, respectively. The first
order condition from the generation’s maximisation problem is
1
st
=
αγ
Pt+1 − hPt . (5)
The first order condition allows us to find the maximum of utility as the
utility function is strictly concave with respect to savings, our variable of
choice. We assume that the abatement effort is a result of a collective
decision process by each generation.
2.3 The Firms
The firms produce with a constant returns to scale technology, y = f(k)L,
where we normalise the labour supply to L = 1. We furthermore assume the
standard conditions f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0. Then firms maximize profits
in a competitive market that clears, such that
f ′(kt+1)− δ = rt+1, (6)
f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt = wt, (7)
st = kt+1. (8)
We moreover use the Cobb-Douglas output function to specify the produc-
tion technology, with f(k) = km, where m ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share.
Finally, and without loss of generality, we assume full depreciation, δ = 1,
during the course of one generation. Empirical evidence suggests this cap-
tures reality appropriately.
2.4 The Intertemporal Equilibrium
We first define the intertemporal equilibrium of this economy.
Intertemporal equilibrium: The intertemporal equilibrium of the above
depicted economy is a sequence {kt, Pt}∞t=0 with given initial conditions
{k0, P0} which satisfies the two equations that rule the dynamics, (9) and
(10).
By combining the first order condition with the market clearing condi-
tion, the output function, as well as the budget constraints and the pollution
equation, we obtain
kt+1 = −1− b− h
γ(1− α) Pt −
mβ +mγ − γ
γ(1− α) k
m
t . (9)
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and
Pt+1 =
h+ bα− α
1− α Pt −
(mβ +mγ − γ)α
(1− α) k
m
t . (10)
By taking kt = k and Pt = P , we derive the steady states of this economy.
There exist two steady states, one is trivial with {k, P} = (0, 0). The other
steady state is given by
k =
(
(1− h)(mβ +mγ − γ)
γ(bα+ h− 1)
) 1
1−m
, (11)
for mβ + mγ − γ 6= 0 and bα + h − 1 6= 0, where k > 0 provided that
mβ +mγ − γ and bα+ h− 1 have the same sign, as well as
P =
αγ
1− h
(
(1− h)(mβ +mγ − γ)
γ(bα+ h− 1)
) 1
1−m
. (12)
Given the above reasoning, we shall from now on impose the following con-
dition.
Assumption 1 We assume mβ +mγ − γ < 02. We furthermore im-
pose that h+ αb− 1 < 0.
This assumption is consistent with a wide range of parameters for m,
β and γ and is required for the existence of positive steady states. We
furthermore take the case of long-lasting pollutants like climate change or
nuclear waste, such that b is very small. This allows to focus our analysis
on an extensive range for the parameter of concern, h.
The effect of pollution perception on the steady state can be discovered
by taking the derivative of (11) and (12) with respect to h. After rearranging
we obtain
∂k
∂h
= − bαk
(1− h)(1−m)(bα+ h− 1) . (13)
Based on our Assumption 1, the steady state capital stock increases with
increases the pollution perception parameter, h. Obviously, if generations
perceive the stock of pollution to be lower than it actually is, they will fell
less concerned about it and thus produce more and abate less.
2This assumption is equivalent to β < γ
 
1
m
− 1. In general, the capital share is
around m = 1/3, which leads to β being less than twice the value of γ. In other words,
we allow that it takes less effort to pollute than to clean up.
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By similar calculation for (12) we obtain
∂P
∂h
=
P
(1− h)(1−m)
[
−m− 1− h
bα+ h− 1
]
. (14)
Hence pollution perception h will always increase the steady state stock
of pollution3. Intuitively, if generations are less concerned with the actual
stock of pollution, they will be willing to trade-off a higher stock of pollution
for a higher capital stock.
3 The Dynamics
By linearising equations (9) and (10) around the non-trivial steady state we
obtain the dynamics around the steady state. Proposition 1 summarises our
results. These are given with respect to the various assumptions that we
priorly imposed.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The non-trivial steady state (k, P ) is asymptotically stable in the sense
of Lyapunov, if and only if either of the following conditions holds
(1) 0 < α < (1+m)2−b(1−m) , and 0 ≤ h < 1− bα
or
(2) (1+m)2−b(1−m) < α < 1 and
α(2−b(1−m))−(1+m)
1−m < h < 1− bα.
(15)
The convergence towards the asymptotic steady state exhibits a spiral
motion.
(ii) The non-trivial steady state (k, P ) is instable, if and only if the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied
(1 +m)
2− b(1−m) < α < 1, and 0 ≤ h <
α(2− b(1−m))− (1 +m)
1−m .
(16)
(iii) The system generates a Flip bifurcation if the subsequent conditions
hold
(1 +m)
2− b(1−m) < α ≤ 1, and 0 < h =
α(2− b(1−m))− (1 +m)
1−m .
(17)
3A sufficient condition for this is given by our assumption that b ∈ (0, 1) and that
α < 1.
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Finally, a sufficient but not necessary condition for positive abatement is
α ≤ mβγ−mγ .
Proof 1 Assume 0 < α < 1 and 0 < h < 1 − bα. We are going to analyse
the system for its various dynamics by linearising the equations that describe
the dynamics around their non-trivial steady state. In the further analysis
we are going to take the known parameters b,m, γ, β as fixed, but allow the
uncertain parameters α and h to vary. So, linearizing equations (9) and
(10) around the non-trivial steady state (k, P ), gives the following Jacobian
matrix
J(k, P ) =

−m(mb+mγ − γ)
γ(1− α) k
m−1 −1− h− b
γ(1− α)
−αm(mb+mγ − γ)
1− α k
m−1 h+ bα− α
(1− α)

=

−m(bα+ h− 1)
(1− h)(1− α) −
1− h− b
γ(1− α)
−αmγ(bα+ h− 1)
(1− h)(1− α)
h+ bα− α
(1− α)
 ,
(18)
where the last equality is obtained by substituting (11) into the first matrix.
Suppose the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the system given by
the equations (9) and (10) are λj , j = 1, 2. The steady state (k, P ) is asymp-
totically stable if and only if for any j = 1, 2 the norm of the eigenvalues is
|λj | < 1. The characteristic function of the Jacobian matrix is
(1−h)(1−α)λ2− [(1−h)(h+bα−α)−m(h+bα−1)]λ+mh(h+bα−1) = 0.
(19)
Therefore, the solutions of the characteristic function are given by
λ1,2 =
[(1− h)(h+ bα− α)−m(h+ bα− 1)]∓√∆
2(1− h)(1− α) , (20)
where
∆ = [(1−h)(h+bα−α)−m(h+bα−1)]2−4(1−h)(1−α)mh(h+bα−1) > 0,
due to the fact that 0 < α < 1 and 0 < h < 1 − bα. Hence in this case,
the two eigenvalues are real, with one being positive and the other being
negative. A positive and negative eigenvalue imply spiral movements of
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the system. Denote λ1 < 0 and λ2 > 0. Therefore, the steady state is
asymptotically stable if and only if
−1 < λ1 < 0, and 0 < λ2 < 1.
Step 1. We prove that λ2 < 1, which is equivalent to showing that
√
∆ < 2(1− h)(1− α)− [(1− h)(h+ bα− α)−m(h+ bα− 1)].
Taking squares on both side and using the definition of ∆, after rearranging
the terms, we have that
(1−m)h2 + (1−m)(2− bα)h+ (1−m)(1− bα) > 0,
which is a second order polynomial with positive coefficients. We can check
that given the parameter conditions, the above is always true for any 0 < h,
hence for 0 < h < 1− bα.
Step 2. We prove that −1 < λ1. Similarly to above we obtain, after
rearranging the terms that −1 < λ1 if and only if
h >
α(2− b(1−m))− (1 +m)
1−m ,
which is always positive, provided that
α >
1 +m
2− b(1−m) .
If
0 < α ≤ 1 +m
2− b(1−m) ,
take
h > 0.
We also can prove that for any 0 < α < 1
α(2− b(1−m))− (1 +m)
1−m < 1− bα.
Conclusively, we have that for j = 1, 2,|λj | < 1, if and only if the conditions
as given by the equations (15) hold.
The case for h = 0 can be treated as follows. In the case of h = 0, the first
order condition can be rewritten as
Pt+1 = αγkt+1. (21)
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Substituting equation (21) and equation (21) iterated backwards into the
pollution emission equation (1), then rearranging terms, gives
kt+1 = −α(1− b)1− α kt +
γ −mβ −mγ
γ(1− α) k
m
t . (22)
Rewriting Equation (1) gives
Pt+1 = (1− b)Pt + (mβ +mγ − γ)kmt + γkmt+1. (23)
Then the linearized system around its steady state is
(
kt+1
Pt+1
)
= J0(k0, P0)
(
kt
Pt
)
+

(1− bα)(1−m)
1− α k0
αγ(1− bα)(1−m)
1− α k0
 , (24)
where the Jacobian is
J0(k0, P0) =

bα(1−m) + (m− α)
1− α 0
−αγ 1− b−m(1− bα)
1− α 1− b
 . (25)
The two eigenvalues of the above system are positive and given by λ3 =
1−b(< 1) and λ4 = bα(1−m)+(m−α)1−α . Hence the steady state is asymptotically
stable if and only if |λ4| < 1, which is equivalent to
1 +m
2− b(1−m) < α < 1.
Thus the steady state is instable if and only if 0 < α < 1+m2−b(1−m) . Further-
more, if α = 1+m2−b(1−m) , a Flip bifurcation occurs.
The condition on positive abatement can be obtained as follows: As
At = wt − st and st = kt+1, we can then substitute the solutions wt =
f(k)−f ′(k)k as well as the dynamical equation for kt+1, as given by equation
(9). Hence At = (1 −m)kmt + 1−b−hγ(1−α)Pt + mβ+mγ−γγ(1−α) kmt . The coefficient on
pollution is always positive, so a sufficient condition for positive abatement
is 0 ≤ (1−m) + mβ+mγ−γγ(1−α) , which implies that γ ≤ mβα(1−m) . ¥
Figure 2 summarises the results of proposition 1 for ease of demonstra-
tion in a simple graph for the standard case of m = 1/3 and assuming a slow
natural improvement in pollution with b = 0.1 (e.g. for climate change).
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Figure 2: Regions of stability and instability for combinations of h and α
The hatched area (labelled AS) refers to the combination of h and α
where the model leads to asymptotic stable dynamics, whereas the cross-
hatched area (labelled IS) refers to the parameter combination that leads to
instability. The thick dark line shows the combinations of h and α which
lead to Flip bifurcations.
Then Figure 3 depicts the dynamics and steady state equations for cer-
tain, general values of the parameters4, such that the steady state is asymp-
totically stable.
As our system generates one positive and one negative eigenvalue, this
periodic cycling appears for any steady state. Furthermore, the closer we
get to the combination of parameters leading to bifurcations, the stronger
the periodic cycling effect.
4 Welfare Analysis and Intergenerational Equity
Overlapping generation models, even most continuous time growth models,
augmented with an environmental sector (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994)
possess clear dynamics. Utility either increases or decreases over time given
4The chosen values are as follows: b = 0.1, h = 0.6, γ = 0.2, α = 0.75, m = 0.3,
β = 0.35.
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Figure 3: Dynamics under partial concern (for 0 ≤ h < 1− bα)
an optimal choice of consumption and abatement. Some models have the
capacity to generate nonlinear dynamics, especially those models which ob-
tain Environmental Kuznets Curve relationships (e.g. Stokey, 1998). Only
very few models actually create non-monotonic behaviour in form of cycles
and bifurcations (Bre´chet and Lambrecht, 2004; Seegmuller and Verche`re,
2004).
In the case of Bre´chet and Lambrecht (2004), these bifurcations or cycli-
cal behaviour are a result of the choice of a specific resource function, and
therefore these dynamics don’t derive directly from the inside of the model.
Furthermore, they provide no attempt in trying to explain these cyclical
dynamics within welfare analysis. Seegmuller and Verche`re (2004) develop
a similar model as we do, but with a much less general utility function (they
use U = ct+1−P 2t+1) and, most importantly, without a pollution perception
factor, h. In effect, their cyclical dynamics (they find a flip bifurcation) arise
only for specific cases of parameter combinations at one specific point.
The interest in non-monotonic behaviour derives from an intergenera-
tional equity point of view. If some generations possess the capacity to re-
duce future generation’s utility in relation to their own, then most intergen-
erational equity theories demand policy makers to act upon this behaviour
(e.g. egalitarianism). The following proposition summarises the motion of
utility on the optimal path.
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Figure 4: Changes in welfare, abatement, pollution perception, consumption
and capital on the optimal path
Proposition 2 The level of utility on the optimal path is a function of
the optimal capital stock and thus follows the periodic cycling movement of
capital. In particular, the utility level is either pro-cyclical (if m > α) or
counter-cyclical (if m < α) depending on the relative importance of pollution
in generating utility.
Proof 1 For the proof we utilise the utility function of each generation.
We have that utility is equal to u(·) = ln(ct+1) − α ln(Pt+1 − hPt) and we
substitute ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)st, which equals mkmt+1, and we substitute the
FOC. Thus we get ln(mkmt+1)−α ln(αγkt+1) = (m−α) ln(kt+1)+ ln( m(αγ)α ).
Hence, utility on the optimal path is only a function of the capital stock.
If m < α then utility is counter-cyclical, and for m > α utility will be
pro-cyclical. ¥
Figure 4 describes the changes in utility for the general parameter choices
that we also use for generating Figure 3. The assumptions imply that h +
bα−α < 0 andm < α. It is easy to observe that utility has a counter-cyclical
relationship with capital stock, but a pro-cyclical relationship with pollution.
The reason for this is that, for m < α, pollution is important enough to
superimpose its effect on utility. Generations will thus face different levels of
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utility depending on when they are born. However, no generation can choose
at which point in time it will exist. But each generation will prefer to be
born with the expectation of at least the same utility level as its predecessor.
The dynamic path that we obtain does not allow this to happen all the
time. As the conditions for periodic cycling in an economy described by
our model are extremely broad and happen for all parameter configurations
(taking the known parameters m, b, γ, β fixed), it is necessary to see where
the intergenerational inequality comes from.
We shall analyse our result of periodic cycling towards steady state with
the aid of a concept called Intergenerational Moral Intuition, as developed by
Schumacher (2005). This concept is based on three simple, straight forward
axioms.
Axiom 1: If agents want to do something good5 for consecutive generations,
they should be allowed to.
Axiom 2: If agents’ actions induce an adverse outcome6 on any of its
subsequent generations, they should be prevented from doing so.
Axiom 3: Axiom 2 always has priority over Axiom 1.
We can easily identify that Axiom 2 is violated. Under our assumption,
pollution is more important for utility than consumption, as m < α (We
could as well impose m > α, which only reverses the arguments). Hence,
generation t = τ will reduce pollution by producing and consuming less, and
thereby increases its own utility. However, this behaviour cannot continue if
capital and pollution are not to go to zero. This thus imposes sacrifices on
generation t = τ + 1. The τ + 1 generation must give up more of its utility
in order to increase the capital stock again7. Hence the violation of Axiom
2.
On the other hand we notice that Axiom 1 is violated, too. The reason
for this periodic cycling is because some generations feel the need to clean
the environment, which allows the future generation to produce more. But
this then leads to a violation of Axiom 2 due to the period cycling. By Ax-
iom 3, the behaviour of the first generation leading to the periodic cycling is
thus not allowed. Thus, without considering long-term planning (spanning
several generations), the only means to avoid this intergenerational inequal-
ity is by keeping capital and thus pollution constant. This is the only way
5Although loosely defined, this can be interpreted as (for example) increasing future’s
utility via reducing pollution.
6An adverse outcome can be interpreted as violating a basic sustainability requirement,
as captured by du
dt
≥ 0, ∀t. See Pezzey (1997) for a discussion of this kind of constraint in
optimal growth models.
7This result always holds given that m < α.
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to satisfy the axioms imposed by the Intergenerational Moral Intuition and
is equivalent to the maximin outcome as imposed by Egalitarianism.
Our conclusion for policy taking is thus as follows. Considering periods
of up to one generation is not enough in order to foresee intergenerational
injustice. Our model predicts periodic cycling for the whole range of the un-
certain parameters h and α. Thus, if a policy maker would like to satisfy the
axioms of Intergenerational Moral Intuition, then this analysis calls either
for the implementation of the strict maximin criterion or for time-frames
for decision-taking of several generations in order to acknowledge and thus
prevent period cycling via appropriate intergenerational transfers.
14
References
1. Bre´chet, T. and Lambrecht, S. (2004) Puzzling over sustainability: an
equilibrium analysis, CORE Discussion Paper 2005/1.
2. John, A. and Pecchenino, R. (1994) An overlapping generations model
of growth and the environment, The Economic Journal, 104, p. 1393-
1410.
3. Pezzey, J. 1997, ”Sustainability constraints, versus ”optimality” versus
intertemporal concern, and axioms versus data”, Land Economics 73,
No. 4, p. 448-466.
4. Seegmuller, T. and Verche`re, A. (2004) Pollution as a source of endoge-
nous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality in OLG economies ,
Economics Letters 84, p. 363-369.
5. Schumacher, I. (2005) Reviewing Social Discounting within Intergen-
erational Moral Intuition, Environmental Economics and Management
Memorandum,
6. Stokey, N. (1998) Are There Limits to Growth?, International Eco-
nomic Review 39, No.1, p. 1-31.
7. Wendner, R. (2002) Capital Accumulation and Habit Formation, Eco-
nomics Bulletin 4, No. 7, p. 1-10.
15
